Introduction
Prison reform in England and Wales received a high profile in British Prime Minister David Cameron's final legislative plan in early 2016. This was surprising, since it is often difficult to find legislative time for the interests of people who have offended.
Cameron asserted that prisons should be 'places of care, not just punishment ' (2016) .
Although some potentially positive steps were proposed in the White Paper outlining the Government's plans (increasing prison staff numbers, prison officer training, and a focus on rehabilitation Ministry of Justice 2016), these were widely criticised as underresourced and inadequate (Sim 2016) . After a period of uncertainty under Prime Minister May and Minister for Justice Truss, the proposed changes were ultimately scrapped. Problems of severe overcrowding, low morale among staff and violence in prisons in England and Wales persist. Given the legislative attention that Brexit demands, and May's unstable Premiership following the unexpected 2017 British General Election, the future of prison reform under Minister for Justice Lidington is unclear, as prison reform is absent from current legislative proposals.
People who have offended should, as Cameron argued, be valued; but not as 'potential assets to be harnessed' (Cameron 2016 ). This language is deeply troubling: offenders are not objects to be exploited as instruments of capitalist enterprise.
Offenders are people with pasts, but also families and futures. Following the Kantian duty to recognise persons as ends in themselves, we should not value people who have offended only as mere instrumental means to societal benefits. Care and relational ethical approaches also suggest that all persons are entitled to care and support. We should support offenders as intrinsically valuable persons. Further, if we can derive the greatest amount of benefit per unit of resource by targeting assistance to the least well-off members of society, and if many offenders are among these least well-off people, then pragmatically, caring for offenders has potential to amplify the effects of state welfare resources. Supporting offenders may be particularly helpful, if we can persuade individuals to move away from harmful behaviours, to themselves and others; and towards constructive social engagement. But the potential benefits to the offender's community, including the offenders' desistance, social contributions, and the amplification of welfare resources, are side-benefits, adding instrumental weight only to the case for supporting offenders. This paper considers state obligations towards criminal offenders, arguing that caring is primarily demanded in criminal punishment, in recognition of offenders' equal personhood. Eva Feder Kittay's 'some mother's child' paradigm motivates empathy by grounding a shared basic dignity in the human experience of receiving care, and highlights indirect reciprocity through nested relationships. Care ethics more broadly stresses the significance of relationships (Barnes 2012, 145) . While I do not discuss offenders' agency, nothing here should be taken to suggest that offenders should be passively infantilized as care is provided. Care providing requires an active, responsive engagement, and collaboration between care-giving and care-receiving parties. The at least partly mutually dependent process of caring-with is useful for understanding participatory relationships between individuals and state agents, detailed in Barnes and Prior (2009) . Care ethics has been applied in similar apparently counter intuitive contexts, including violence (Held 2010 van Eijk 2016; Carlen 2013, 91) .
1 Not all disadvantaged people become offenders. Yet, we are foolish to ignore this correlation even if we do not fully understand the cause (Reiman 2007, 29) . As Carlen identifies, many imprisoned offenders are 'ill-equipped mentally, culturally, materially and socially for leading law-abiding lives ' (2013, 92) . Punishment frequently further undermines these capabilities.
There are some surprising similarities and differences between welfare and punishment policy. While welfare is generally considered to confer individual benefits;
1 UK Ministry of Justice longitudinal research suggest that, of Adult prisoners: 29% were abused as children (Williams, Papadopoulou, and Booth 2012, 9) , 47% have no qualifications (Hopkins 2012, 14) , 25% suffer from both anxiety and depression (Cunniffe et al. 2012, 5) , 25% of women prisoners and 15% of men report symptoms of psychosis (Light, Grant, and Hopkins 2013, 20) , and 46% of women prisoners and 21% of men had previously attempted suicide (Light, Grant, and Hopkins 2013, 18) . In the four weeks prior to custody, 64% of prisoners report using illegal drugs (Light, Grant, and Hopkins 2013, 12) , only 32% were employed (Hopkins 2012, 7) and 15% were homeless (Williams, Poyser, and Hopkins 2012, 1 (Lewis 1976, 279) .
While a 'doctrine of less eligibility' places offenders 'last in line' for any welfare good (Carlen 2013, 96) ; caring for offenders may amplify the effects of our caring. If we can enable offenders' own caring for themselves and others, this potentially extends the reach of our welfare resources across offenders, their dependents, and community. There are no guarantees that supported past offenders will successfully attempt social engagement in co-operative projects. Analogously, community engagement in programmes to address local social and economic needs can be similarly difficult to obtain: despite the efforts of local organisers, there is no guarantee that any local scepticism will be overcome (Barnes 2012, 137 ). Yet, without the work of local organisers, achieving such community engagement would be more difficult. Likewise, barriers to positive engagement with the community exist when a person struggles to meet her own needs and her dependents' needs. Barriers to social contribution are reduced when a person has help to meet their needs, and support in meeting their caring responsibilities.
Criminal justice responds to wrongs. Welfare policies respond to disadvantage, arising from differences in the distribution of opportunities or outcomes, and material wealth. Such questions of distribution are, at least in part, questions of social justice.
Criminal justice processes cannot and should not be expected to single-handedly address distributive social injustices. But we can consider criminal punishment in light of broader social and political questions, about the distribution of responsibilities and resources for needs-meeting. Barnes argues that we should look not simply to alleviate disadvantage, but at how disadvantage is produced, and at more distant, formal and impersonal relationships (2012, 123, 107) . Criminal punishment may be an example of formal relationships which contribute to disadvantage production and entrenchment. I will discuss three ways in which supporting and caring for offenders provides opportunities to build capabilities rather than to compound disadvantage.
Care Ethics, Capabilities and Flourishing
Care ethics offers us two alternative perspectives for thinking about using state resources in the context of punishment and welfare. Firstly, a relational approach, acknowledging interdependence is highlighted in contemporary care ethics (Barnes 2012, 65) . Secondly, care ethics can be used to consider political decisions about distribution and social arrangements for meeting needs (Tronto 1993, 175; Robinson 1999, 30-33; Held 2015) . Care ethics offers an approach to moral reasoning that values relationships, and recognises interdependence, vulnerability and dependence as normal features of human lives. Dependence varies between individuals and over our lives, and social conditions may conceal dependence. For much of history, caring work has been performed by slaves, poorly paid servants, and unpaid family members (Tronto 1993, 113 ). The privileged have been able to 'buy' their way out of caring
labour, yet we all begin our lives in conditions of utter dependence. This has hidden the value of caring work.
Caring work, necessary for any form of human life (Held 2006, 17 cf; Herring 2013, 68) , meets essential needs for living well in our society which we cannot meet alone. Caring includes 'everything that we do to maintain, continue, and repair our "world" so that we can live in it as well as possible' to include 'our bodies, our selves, and our environment' woven together 'in a complex, life-sustaining web' (Fisher and Tronto 1991, 40) . Core examples of 'capability-building' care work include the care and education of young children (learning the basic skills necessary to negotiate the social world); or medical care (a stroke survivor re-learning to walk). Caring work meets basic human needs, strengthens an individual's basic capabilities, and avoids unwanted and unnecessary harms (Engster 2007, 76) . Good caring practices are attentive, responsive and respectful towards the individual receiving care (Engster 2007, 31) , and engage with the care-receiver.
Capabilities foster the skills we need to meet our own needs, our responsibilities, and to live flourishing lives. Some authors list basic capabilities (Nussbaum 2000 , 78-80 employed by Engster, 2007 , others champion the benefits of the concept, while remaining sceptical of the usefulness of lists (Sen 2004 (Tronto 1993 (Tronto , 140, 2013 . Caring as 'capability-building' may help to build the mental, social and cultural capabilities, which Carlen identifies as low or lacking for many prisoners, capabilities that are further damaged by imprisonment (2013, 92) .
Instrumentally necessary and intrinsically valuable social relationships require companionship and social connection, as well as individual capabilities and resources.
For example: we cannot enjoy membership of an extended family, political participation, or socio-economic co-operation, such as employment, without others (Brownlee 2016, 66) . Further, some individually enjoyed goods depend on prior collective action, such as individually benefitting through friendly societies or state welfare, or making individual use of public transport.
Why should we care?
An inclusive, relational account of equality is offered by Eva Kittay motivating us towards equal recognition, inclusion and empathy for the other. 'We have each experienced care in our lives -even the most destitute among us -for without it, we cannot reach maturity' (Kittay 2005, 113, see also; Held 2006, 81) . Everyone surviving beyond infancy has necessarily received care and therefore counts as 'some mother's child'. This account, Kittay suggests, is cross-cultural: based on our common human vulnerability and the mother-child relationship that, she argues, is found in all societies. Kittay intends to include any care provided by anyone, regardless of the relationship between care-giving 'mother' and vulnerable 'child'. Having been, at least once, the object of another's care, is fundamental to human dignity for Kittay (2005, 116) .
We are entitled, Kittay writes, firstly to relationships within which we can receive care; and secondly to social support in our caring for others. This follows not from our rights (or needs) as independent individuals, but rather stems from connections with 'those with whom we have had and are likely to have relations of care and dependency' (Kittay 1999, 66 ). Kittay's indirect reciprocity, or 'nested' relationships are important for thinking about caring beyond dyadic relationships (Kittay 1999, 68) . Others care for us, we care for different others. We either support a third group in their caring, or receive their support for our own caring, at different times. For example: I receive support from my family, enabling me to be fit to work with my students, facilitating their learning. My students and I in turn rely on the labour of university administrators, cleaners, and maintenance staff, to provide a suitable safe space for learning to take place.
Since human infants perish without nurturing support, we are all 'some mother's child': someone 'mothered' us, providing essential care, permitting our survival into the present (Kittay 2005, 114) . As a mother's child, we each have the dignity of being a person in whom care has been invested, motivating empathy and inclusion, and Kittay's entitlement to care and support in care-giving. Yet, it is not helpful to conceive of caring as discrete, isolated, unidirectional acts. In many cases, care-giver and care-receiver experience directly reciprocated caring (Herring 2013, 153) .
The strengths and weaknesses of the 'some mother's child' paradigm
The 'some mother's child' paradigm prompts us towards empathy for the other and recognition of shared vulnerabilities. Recognising indirect reciprocity and nested dependencies is Kittay's key insight. Yet the rhetorical strength of the mother-child dyad risks overshadowing the nested relationships, indirect reciprocity and broader interdependence; and the language risks essentialising gender and infantilising us all in the moment of receiving care. With Barnes, it is inadequate to conceptualise care only in terms of the mother-child dyad, or any other single type of caring (Barnes 2015) . A critical ethic of care requires us to recognise our responsibility for more (morally) distant and formal relationships (2012, 124) , including state agent -individual relationships. Barnes argues that a strength of the feminist perspective is the recognition that care is not and cannot be contained within intimate, private, family relationships, since these exist within social relations of inequality (59). Kittay's wider and more recent work on this motivates us towards recognising the interdependencies and responsibilities in these wider relationships (Calder et al. 2016 ).
Mere survival does not include developing capabilities and flourishing, potentially setting the bar too low to identify care. Some children suffer unsupportive, abusive home lives, falling through child protection safety nets, and yet receive minimally sufficient nutrition and shelter to reach adulthood. Suppose a guardian provides minimal necessities for survival, but only to prevent a child from crying out in hunger or pain, rather than any concern for the child's wellbeing. It is important to be While state -individual relationships cannot be dissolved during punishment, actions and choices for which we are responsible can change the nature of our relationships and Kittay's entitlements. Criminal offending breaches trust expectations, often ignoring both the rights and needs of others. This formulation includes offences against specific others, apparently 'victimless' crimes (for example, drug possession offences), and regulatory offences (for example, safety regulations and paying taxes that provide public services), which are part of the social and political organisation of responsibilities to minimise harms. Offenders remain persons, but 'lose standing', or hierarchical social respect as esteem within the community, changing these relationships (Bennett 2008, 153) .
Criminal offending 'strips' us of some rights, yet some non-derogable rights cannot be removed under any circumstances (Kittay 1999, 69) . Kittay offers an analogy with basic rights (equal inclusion, basic needs for food, shelter, and medical care).
Some rights, such as liberty, may be abridged in lawful punishment. Basic rights apply to everyone and cannot be ignored, even for the most 'vicious' prisoners (1999, 69).
On the 'rights' side of her analogy, we can include human rights applying specifically to people who may be, or who are, offenders: the right to a fair trial, no punishment Further, offender's 'full treatment' as 'some mother's child' 'may be justifiably overridden by other social needs', as a 'temporary' measure. But our status as a mother's child, 'can never be fully relinquished ' (1999, 69 give care, and develop the capacity, particularly within the family and the mother-child relationship. This involves difficulty and effort on the part of the learner, and the provision of support and continuity from the same carer. This allows most of us to have developed some capacity for care by adulthood (Hollway 2006, 42) . Even young children make attempts to give care, and Hollway reports several examples: a toddler comforting a parent as they have been comforted; or calling out to reassure an infant sibling, as they have observed their parent to act (2006, 43, 60) . However, all we require as 'some mother's child' is sufficient nurturing to reach maturity. Mere survival does not necessarily include the stable, supportive environment, which the complex process of learning care requires.
Three possibilities may explain failure of learning to care. Firstly, abused or neglected individuals may not have received sufficient care, and cannot be understood as having had an adequate opportunity to learn. Secondly, individuals may have received enough care, but at a time when they were not both ready and able to learn.
Thirdly, individuals may have received and understood care, but rejected the lesson.
Similarly, Jean Hampton suggests that although punishment may present moral arguments for avoiding criminal behaviour, the offender decides whether to listen (1984, 232) , leaving space for her agency and autonomy.
That previous opportunities to learn about care were absent, failed or rejected, does not preclude offenders from learning to care in the present. Carlen criticizes contemporary prison practices more broadly as effectively de-habilitative (2013, 98) , depleting offenders' practical and emotional resources to care for themselves and
others. Yet we expect some support in punishment, such as mental health treatment, addiction support, and remedial education. By building on these practices and recognising them as caring, we can normalise care-giving and care-receiving; and provide an opportunity to learn practical and social skills for self-care and care for others. Some prisoners may never have had these learning opportunities (Jablecki 2005, 32; Braithwaite 2002, 98) . This offers potential habilitation (Jablecki 2005, 32) , strength building (Ward 2010) or capability building. This echoes Kittay's entitlement to relationships through which we receive care. 'constructive' and 'respectable' identities as "workers", and to establish legitimate ways of making money (Weaver and McNeill 2015, 101) . Enabling prisoners to build skills, routines and identities as workers in prison may contribute to desistance from offending on release.
Prisoner employees built skills, experienced standard working routines, and were paid fairly, reflecting market take home pay. Prisoners took some responsibility for the needs of their families by sending money home (Howard League for Penal
Reform 2010, 5); and attempted to repair the harms arising from crime by choosing to make charitable donations towards services for victims and prisoners' families (Green 2008, 17-18) . Working for a salary may not be the work we usually wish to include as core 'caring' work, which Tronto contrasts with 'office work ' (1993, 134) . Tronto is rightly sceptical of the use of money to buy services, as a 'pass-out' from caring responsibility for the privileged (2013, (80) (81) (82) . This allows the rich to indirectly 'care about', in Tronto's terms, by purchasing services and passing direct 'caring-for' responsibilities to others (1993, 106 ).
Yet, for prisoners, paying money enables remote participation in caring since to help prisoners reflect on and strengthen skills and capabilities necessary for being 'part of a family and a community ' (Safe Ground 2016) . A study of similar programmes in Norway for fathers in prison suggests that these programmes can lay a foundation for desistance, but that follow-up support is required to realise this potential (Hansen 2017 Defending offenders' inclusion as subjects of care
An empirical case can be made for supportive practices in punishment. The desistance paradigm, noted above as an offender centred process, resonates with care practices:
valuing individualised, responsive support, valuing relationships, and recognising the role of the community in supporting desistance after punishment (Deering and Smith 2016, 299) . The importance of supportive social structures and relationships suggests that punishment practitioners can play a role in supporting offender-led desistance (Maruna and Toch 2001; McNeill, Raynor, and Trotter 2010; McNeill et al. 2012, 7) . For instance, we know stable homes and jobs are important for reducing reoffending (May, Sharma, and Stewart 2008, 6) . Desistance is less well-researched for minority groups, such as women offenders (Hedderman, Gunby, and Shelton 2011, 16) ;
although the meta-analysis of Rodermond et al (2015) identifies factors requiring further research in relation to women offenders, such as the influence of parenthood, the criminality of peers, and employment.
Recent research suggests that the social connectedness and feelings of selfworth of formerly imprisoned US women was enhanced when they were permitted to support other desisting offenders. Acting as role models and mentors for more recently released prisoners, the women drew on shared experiences to help their mentees avoid mistakes. These care-giving mentors supported their mentee's desistance, while simultaneously improving their own community reintegration, and planning careers to give back to the community (Heidemann et al. 2016, 9, 22) . This suggests that permitting offenders opportunities to practice self-care, care giving and community giveback, facilitated offenders' own community reintegration, in turn making engagement with others and broader social flourishing possible. Heidemann et al suggest this practice may offer some success in reducing recidivism.
These empirical findings suggest that caring for offenders may amplify state resources, providing further benefits to others in the community beyond the supported offender. Welfare resources used to support offenders may be amplified in three ways, each of which resonate with Kittay's entitlements to relationships of care.
Offenders may receive and learn about care, laying foundations for offenders' caregiving. Supported offenders are enabled to care for themselves and for their dependents, and offenders are able to contribute to their community by engaging with and supporting others (for example, mentees or employers), providing benefits to the wider community.
The amplification of state resources, and the benefits to others are welcome side-consequences. We cannot guarantee that supported offenders will choose and successfully achieve positive social contribution. But when we support offenders, we build capabilities for, and reduce the barriers to, offenders' engagement with and support for others. It is far easier to engage constructively in the broader life of one's community, working, volunteering, or simply being a good neighbour, with Kittay's entitlements to care. Primarily, we ought to care for offenders and support offenders' caring as part of punishment, in recognition of offender's equal personhood and entitlement to Kittay's relationships of care, as equal subjects of care and as caregivers.
Conclusion
When prisoners are not able to care for themselves, or their families, the state pays punishment and welfare costs. When offenders receive care, and are enabled to build capabilities for caring, this potentially reduces the need for state welfare support.
When offenders' lives are stable, and their caring responsibilities manageable, we remove barriers to broader engagement in social co-operation, to 'maintain, continue, and repair our 'world' so that we can live in it as well as possible' (Fisher and Tronto 1991, 40 
